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Ojo: Audits, Audit Quality and Signalling Mechanisms



Marianne Ojo (Oxford Brookes University – School of Social Sciences and Law ; The Institute for Business and Finance Research, LLC ; Faculty of Commerce and Administration) has posted “Audits, Audit Quality and Signalling Mechanisms: Concentrated Ownership Structures“.

The abstract is as follows:     

Do jurisdictions with concentrated ownership structures require less reliance on audits as corporate governance mechanisms and devices? Why do concentrated ownership structures still prevail in certain jurisdictions which are considered to be “market based corporate governance systems”? More importantly, if failures and causes of recent financial crises are principally attributable to the fact that market based corporate governance mechanisms, such as financial regulators, are not optimally performing their functions, why is the role of audits still paramount in such jurisdictions? These are amongst some of the questions which this paper attempts to address.

The ever increasing growth of institutional investors in jurisdictions – particularly those jurisdictions with predominantly concentrated ownership structures, with their increased stakes in corporate equity, also raises the issue of accountability and the question as regards whether increased accountability is fostered where institutional investors assume a greater role – as opposed to position which exists where increased stake of family holdings (family controlled structures) arises.

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